Putin’s victory in Ukraine would spell “existential danger” to US, Trump’s ex-OSCE envoy warns

The rhetoric of US President-elect Donald Trump on Ukraine has seen a significant shift in the past weeks. Before beating Kamala Harris in the presidential elections, he promised to finish the Russo-Ukraine war in 24 hours or even before he gets to the White House. Now, both his special Ukraine and Russian envoy, General Keith Kellogg, and Trump himself have extended their timeline estimates—100 days and 6 months, respectively.

While Kellogg has reassured that Trump isn’t planning to make concessions to Russian ruler Vladimir Putin, we spoke to James Gilmore, the Republican, 68th Governor of Virginia, who served as the US Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) during the first Trump administration. Our goal was to better understand the behind-the-scenes diplomatic environment during Trump’s first administration and discuss what’s next. The message from Gilmore is clear: “Look at what he does, not says.”

EP: As a former OSCE ambassador, do you still think the organization serves a purpose, given that Russia violated virtually every rule it upholds?

JG: As an Ambassador, I put a lot of thought into that because OSCE is often condemned as just being a “talk shop.” NATO is much more favored by the Americans as an international organization. But as an ambassador, I came to understand the value of messaging, speaking the truth, and talking to citizenry both of the West and the East, so that they understood the American point of view. 

I think OSCE has two great values.

One, it is a communications vehicle. When you go to the Hofburg Palace every Thursday and issue the statement on behalf of your country, another 56 other countries, including the Russians and the Ukrainians, listen to you, and they understand exactly where America is.

Second, the OSCE has a long history, and it sets standards of international relations, order, the rules of law of international relations, condemnation of fake elections, and murder and atrocities.

EP: What was it like during Trump’s first administration to work for the OSCE? He’s known for being quite skeptical when it comes to international organizations – be it the United Nations or even NATO.

JG: It didn’t stop me from going.

The UN is the better-known organization in New York City because it’s in a high-media location, but the OSCE in Vienna, Austria, is well-known among Europeans.

Its focus is international or national security in Europe, though it also features the US, Canada, many countries in Central Asia that used to be part of the Russian Empire, as well as all of Eastern Europe, the Scandinavian countries, and Türkiye. 

Trump carried out his foreign policy, and so did the then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. I adhered to that policy.

EP: What would that be?

JG: International politics is much like domestic politics. It’s the ability to know people and to project your values, policies, and goals.

For example, the OSCE has a very major foreign minister meeting at a designated city. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov always attended those meetings, but the US Secretary of State never did.

That projects a certain message, doesn’t it? That the Russians place a higher value on the OSCE than the Americans, even though you can’t escape the fact that the US is always a major influential maker in any meeting of any international organization worldwide, including the OSCE.

EP: So, Lavrov attended them. And Russia has a substantial influence on the OSCE and not just that international organization. But what did they usually do to get people on their side? Which diplomacy tools would they use? After all, Lavrov is quite a rude individual.

JG: My observation is that people gravitate to power.

When Lavrov was there, he was probably the second-highest official in the Russian Federation of Foreign Policy and thus had weight. I noticed that many ambassadors from other countries gravitated to him. If the US Secretary of State had been present, they would have gravitated to him instead.

I was the highest-ranking official available there and attended the meetings on behalf of the US, going into a discussion with Foreign Minister Lavrov when I stated the American position. It’s a chance to get the measure of people.

During my time, the US never deviated from our support for Ukraine and I’d meet with the Ukrainian ambassador every week. We did not meet with the Russians. In hindsight, I think we should have. But we didn’t want to project a message that all was forgiven about Crimea. Still, the Russian ambassador and I were quite cordial, even though our countries took different positions at the weekly meeting.

EP: What is Lavrov like in life?

JG: Firstly, he’s a very tall man. He projects smoothness and has polish. He’s a very reasonable guy, except, of course, when he’s giving the Russian line in official meetings, with his position being wholly unacceptable.

I don’t believe that the ambassadors at the OSCE who represented the other 56 countries were persuaded by him. And I don’t think they were trying to persuade anyone. I think the Russian approach at that organization, and all organizations, is to project their national position. They don’t care if it’s rude or ugly. 

EP: Does diplomacy behind closed doors differ greatly from what we hear publicly?

JG: In my case, the behind-the-scenes diplomacy at the ambassadorial level was to project friendship and Western appreciation to our friends. Just pull for the countries that were recently liberated from Russian occupation and be persuasive that the West was the correct direction to go.

The public projections that come through organizations and the press are very important because they are official positions that all react to.

Behind the scenes, you’re trying to make friends, create confidence, and move countries in the right direction, which is more to the West than to the East and the Eastern totalitarianism.

Russia’s goal is to render Ukraine a vassal state

EP: You’re using quite strong language like “totalitarianism” and “Russian imperialism”. It seems to me that some in the GOP have a different sentiment these days. They are more transactional than classic Reagan-like. Is that so?

JG: I have a lifetime history in politics. So, I understand the value of speaking clearly, stating a position, and trying to be persuasive in that position, and I was like that at the permanent council in the OSCE. I think my voice was quite strong there because of the manner in which I addressed people. 

As for the Republican Party. I will report to you that the people who want to pull back and make America a bit of an island seem to have the platform these days. They’re the ones who have the chance to speak out conspicuously. 

Take incoming Vice President J.D. Vance. He had some unfortunate things to say, but he has been much more quiet lately, as you may have noticed. That is much more responsible.

The President-elect has said negative things toward Ukraine, but we don’t know what he’s doing exactly.

He may be setting the stage for a better negotiation with President Putin. It’s difficult to predict but we do have a track record. President Obama, for example, was very hands-off and sent only rations to Ukraine. Meanwhile, President Trump sent Javelin missiles and continued to support Ukraine financially. 

President Biden came in and said nice things about Ukraine and sent money, to be sure, but he was slow to show support because, in my view, he was afraid of President Putin and intimidated by him.

Now we have President Trump. I suggest we look at what he does instead of what he says. General Kellogg is going over to try to create some sort of settlement. I don’t believe he’s going to have very good success with President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov. So far he hasn’t.

But this is all part of the political and diplomatic game.

EP: This is exactly why I asked you whether the behind-the-scenes diplomacy differs, as Russia doesn’t express at the moment that much interest in any ceasefire. There were rude statements coming from some Putin cronies who promised, and I quote, to tell General Kellogg to “screw himself” with his proposals. Accordingly, some Republicans, for example, I talked to, believe that if a ceasefire doesn’t come to fruition, Trump will supply us with a lot of weapons fast. Is that a possibility?

JG: Of course, it’s a possibility. What he has said is that if Putin does not come to the negotiating table, then he will much more fully support Ukraine than President Biden did.

But this is a very preliminary statement. We don’t really know how this diplomacy will go as it gets moving, and General Kellogg is actually over there at the table with the Russians.

Russia’s position is quite strong. Their political goal is to render Ukraine a vassal state and make that the first step towards the reassembly of the old Russian Empire. There’s no question that that’s the goal. They want to quell Ukraine quickly, but the long-term project is much longer.

If they can win in Ukraine now, I think they’re on the move.

EP: Could you elaborate on that “unfortunate” or “unacceptable” situation? What would that look like?

JG: President Putin and the Russians have said that their terms for discussion are that the Ukrainians withdraw from their eastern provinces and surrender those to the Russians; that the annexation of those provinces to Russia be recognized; that Crimea’s annexation be accepted and recognized by Ukraine; and that Ukraine basically become a vassal state of Russia, not in charge of their own foreign policy. They would have to surrender publicly any effort to become part of NATO. 

If they can achieve the political goal through negotiation, they don’t need to have soldiers there. So, I think we should be cautious about a negotiation that leads to a ceasefire, which would be to the detriment of Ukraine and, later, all of Europe.

EP: Russia made its ambitions known in December 2021 when it issued its ultimatum, banning Ukraine from ever acceding into NATO, effectively undoing the post-1997 enlargement of NATO, not accepting new members in principle, especially the post-Soviet members. So, right now, they’ll probably repeat the very same demand. Why would the US accept those terms? What would be the incentive here?

JG: Frankly, I don’t understand the American incentive to this negotiation at all. Now, I could understand that, if the Ukrainian people wanted to have a negotiation, I think they have been badly damaged or terribly hurt with a much smaller population.

There’s a great deal of discussion right now about Ukrainian desertion from the army and people resisting any type of military activity. I don’t know whether it’s Russian propaganda or not. Still, Ukraine is clearly not invulnerable.

But why would the United States want to do this? I take the position that it’s up to Ukrainians. Under OSCE principles, Ukraine is a country. I personally met with their ambassador every week. They sat in the weekly meetings at OSCE as a nation-state. In fact, it was guaranteed under the Budapest Memorandum.

Another question is how Ukraine sees its future. I visited Ukraine in 2021. I did not meet with Zelenskyy, but I did meet with about 10 cabinet ministers. They all said the same thing: they did not want to be part of the Russian Empire. They wanted to be an independent country.

I’m speaking as an American on behalf of the American national interest. I believe it is not in the American national interest for Putin to conquer Ukraine and go from there to conquer additional countries, including and especially the Baltics, and then poison and compromise the politics of Western Europe. That is an existential danger to the United States of America, in my view.

EP: Obviously, I concur. I do want to add that there is a certain level of Ukrainian desire for peace talks. We don’t understand what the end game from the allies is, right? Unfortunately, we don’t have North Korean friends who would supply us with people. Our resources are limited, and the question is probably how we best use them.

So, what security guarantees can we discuss if there’s a ceasefire? Another Budapest memorandum? No, thanks. NATO membership? It’s not like it was ever truly on the table. What other types of security guarantees can we look at? Business contracts, the Israeli defense model? But the Israeli defense model has nukes. What say you?

JG: That’s all pretty granular.

Let me step back and look at the big picture. The question is, what kind of world are we going to have in the 21st century if Ukraine is smaller than Russia, doesn’t have nuclear weapons anymore because of the Budapest Memorandum, and has a limited population relative to Russia?

That’s really what I think is at stake here. For the Americans and the Westerners, and I think it’s well understood, by the way. I think the Poles, the Baltic countries, the Czechs, the Romanians understand it.

EP: Does the President-elect understand this?

JG: We don’t know. That remains to be seen in the future, whether that’s understood or not and, frankly, what his political goals are.

Let me be clear: I do not speak for President Trump or the new administration. I speak from my experience. 

Nobody let Germans off the hook in WWII

EP: One last thing. I watched your previous interviews, and you said that Russia should want a ceasefire. Do you stick to that?

JG: I took that position because all the public information implies that Russia has problems and is having difficulty sustaining this war. It would be in their interest to go to the negotiating table and get their political goals free. By agreement rather than having to fight for it.

It is in their interest to have a negotiation. Unless, of course, Russia’s resources are unlimited and their people are unlimited, and they can conquer Ukraine simply by force of volume of people and resources. Then at that point, why not just continue to proceed to conquest?

But if their resources are limited and have, in fact, less ability to continue this because of the sanctions, trouble within their economy, the loss of hundreds of thousands of soldiers dead and wounded, the loss of any international prestige, including at the OSCE or anywhere else and any of these things hurt them, then it is in their interest to try to negotiate a settlement to their favor.

I believe that they should want to do that. If I were Putin, I’d want that. If he can get out of it on his terms, why wouldn’t you do that?

EP: What if he’s simply a killer deriving joy from this because the Russian society isn’t really responding to it? It’s not a democratic society; it’s not taking to the streets. Doesn’t a psychological factor also play a role here? 

JG: Well, that requires a thorough understanding of the Russian country and people, and what their tolerance is for this of war, and what they believe their goals are.

Putin is basically saying he’s trying to defend Russia by doing this war. It is completely ridiculous, but the Russian people may believe that.

Personally, I believe that it’s up to us to communicate as much as we can, not just to the Ukrainian people or the American people, but to the Russian people, and really give them the information necessary so that they understand what they’re doing.

I’ve often thought about what the accountability is for the Russian people. We know the accountability for the war criminals at the top of their government. But we haven’t had very much discussion about the accountability for the Russian people who are making all of this happen and supporting Putin.

When World War II was over, the Allies didn’t let the German people off the hook. They had really been responsible for supporting Hitler in his conquests. There’s very little discussion right now about the accountability of the Russian people. I think that’s because it’s a sort of a given that the Russian people are being kept unaware.

I don’t know that. But our goal here is to get as much information to them as possible, because if they then continue to support the atrocities, then they are accountable.

EP: There was this Special Tribunal idea. I haven’t heard anything about it lately, and talk about collective responsibility for the Russians, too, because, of course, they are aware of what’s going on. The other thing is that during the Biden administration, they made it clear a lot of times that they’re not at war with the Russian people. There was always this idea that Putin is in a vacuum and somehow the Russians are in some other vacuum even though a lot of them support the war.

One last question. So you suggested that Kellogg right now is in Moscow if I understood you correctly. What does the negotiation process, in general, look like? He goes to Kyiv, Moscow, and European capitals. And then? He goes back to Washington, reports directly to Trump, Rubio? Who usually gathers in these rooms to discuss stuff like that?

JG: First of all, I don’t know whether Kellogg is in Moscow or not. I don’t know his movements right now.

What I’d like to add truthfully is that tyranny is a terrible thing.

Even if the Russian people were to decide they didn’t want this war, if individuals in Russia put their heads up, they might end up in a labor camp in the Arctic Circle. I think they know that, and Putin has projected that by, for example, the murder of Alexey Navalny, who was no great guy personally, but his murder in a labor camp sent a message to the Russian people that they should be quiet.

Regarding what could happen, the US decides its policy with a great deal of input from Congress, of course. Congress participates in American foreign policy, but day in and day out, policies are decided by the President, and he will listen very closely to his National security advisor.

If I were president, I would also be listening to the Secretary of State. I’m not sure that’s going on right now but we will know once Rubio has been confirmed.

I think that there are councils that meet in the White House confidentially, driven by the National Security Adviser, but not exclusively. The intelligence community is present to give their information to the best of their knowledge. They are not perfect, by the way. The diplomatic, military, and political people are largely in the National Security Council.

So, these decisions are discussed and ironed out, but the President ultimately decides what he’s going to do because these people effectively work for him and are his advisors.

EP: So, we will have to wait until 20 January, and all the confirmation processes. 

JG: Yes, but I think that we should not overlook the fact that the Russians are unique in this.

They’ve invested a great deal into this war of people and treasure. They don’t look like they’re getting ready to compromise. They want their goals in their entirety.

We don’t know what will happen then. I believe that if the Russians succeed in their political goals, they are on the road to a much bigger war. Though I’m not administration, my hope is that we can restrain that, and I’m speaking to you and to others because I want to try to talk about these issues and get things moving in the right direction.

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