Lithuania promises to disconnect Baltic States from Russian power grid by 8 February, switching to EU supplies

On 15 January, the Public Security Service (VST) of Lithuania began protecting crucial power link infrastructure, implementing enhanced security measures ahead of Baltic States’ planned disconnection from the Russian power grid by 8 February.

Since the 1990s, Russia has weaponized energy supplies, leveraging gas prices and shipment denials as tools of political pressure. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU largely transitioned to alternative gas and oil suppliers. However, the Baltic countries have continued relying on Russian electricity. Transitioning to electricity supplied from mainland EU will enhance the energy security of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

The security transition at LitPol Link facilities, including the switchyard and transformer substation, was originally scheduled for April but was expedited following an urgent Cabinet approval in early January, LRT reports citing BNS. The service will also secure the NordBalt submarine power cable in Klaipėda, connecting Lithuania and Sweden, from April.

VST has deployed advanced anti-drone systems and specialized weaponry for diverse emergency scenarios, anticipating potential Russian retaliation for rejecting Russian electricity supplies. The service includes an Operational Response and Counterattack Team unit prepared for extremely challenging conditions, though specific personnel numbers remain classified for security reasons, as per LRT.

The Ministry of Interior Affairs states the new security arrangement considers both the upcoming separation from the Russian IPS/UPS system and recent security incidents involving damaged power and telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea.

Lithuania’s Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas emphasized that synchronization with European networks is “vitally important” for both energy and national security, citing “very clear and unambiguous” attempts by hostile states to disrupt the process.

On Christmas, suspected sabotage damaged the Estlink 2 underwater cable supplying electricity from Finland to Estonia, along with four other telecommunications cables in the same region. The tanker Eagle S, suspected in the sabotage, allegedly belongs to Russia’s “shadow fleet” used to transport Russian oil products while circumventing sanctions. Experts and politicians have characterized these recent actions against vital infrastructure as part of Russia’s hybrid warfare against Western countries.

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