Fall of Aleppo deals blow to Russia's Middle East clout, may indirectly strengthen Ukraine's hand
The shock capture of Aleppo by Syrian forces opposed to Bashar al-Assad in recent days has dealt a humiliating blow to the regime and its backers, Russia and Iran, analysts have told the Kyiv Independent.
The surprise offensive has also indirectly helped Ukraine, analysts say.
"This is really quite the conundrum (Russian President Vladimir) Putin has to solve," said Sascha Bruchmann, a military analyst at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.
There is much at stake for Russia — if Assad's regime falls, Russia will lose its regional foothold in the Middle East, including its only naval base in the Mediterranean, and its regional and global influence will be diminished.
But propping up Assad and defending the Syrian capital of Damascus from any rebel advance will require military support that Moscow may not be able to spare when the vast bulk of its forces are fighting in Ukraine.
"Russia is stretched thin so the costs to intervene are high, and the geopolitical benefits may be smaller than (when it first intervened in the Syrian Civil War in 2015)," Bruchmann added.
Why is Syria important for Russia?
Russia and Syria have a long history of close relations, particularly on the military front, and the threat to this alliance from recent events was amply demonstrated in a video posted by rebel forces as they took over a military office in Aleppo adorned with Russian and Syrian flags.
Russia has operated its Tartus naval base in Syria since 1971, and it runs the Khmeimim Air Base and other military facilities in the country.
"Syria represents Moscow's only military foothold in the Mediterranean," Neil Quilliam, a Middle East expert at Chatham House, told the Kyiv Independent.
"It also showcases Russia as a reliable ally willing to defend its partners, reinforcing its credibility in the region."
Bruchmann agreed that "Tartus is vital for Russian power projection in the entire Mediterranean and North Africa."
"It functions as an extended logistics hub for wider ambitions and Russia's support to allies there," he added. "Over the past months, it typically hosted a small flotilla of surface ships, several smaller boats, and at times a submarine, all guarding a fleet of civilian container and supply ships."
Scott Lucas, professor of international politics at University College Dublin, said that Russia was using the Tartus base to "offset where the Americans are up in the northeast of Syria" and project its power against Europe and China as well.
Russia reduces its involvement
Tahrir al-Sham, an Islamist group formerly affiliated with Al Qaeda, as well as the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army and other groups, launched their surprise offensive on Aleppo on Nov. 27. They have captured most of the city since then.
When Assad's regime captured Aleppo in 2016 after years of fighting for the city, Russia's military intervention was a major reason behind his success.
Since 2015, Russia has sent warplanes, tanks, artillery, and ground troops to Syria.
Human rights groups have documented numerous war crimes committed by Russia's air force and other troops against civilians.
"There is a lot of damage to residential areas," Fared Al Mahlool, a Syrian journalist on the ground in Aleppo, told the Kyiv Independent. "There are many victims, including wounded children. The Russians think we are all terrorists, but they are liars."
At the peak of its intervention, Russia had about 5,000 regular troops and thousands of Wagner mercenaries in Syria, according to Western media and analysts.
Quilliam said that "Russia maintains several thousand troops in Syria, though exact numbers are difficult to verify."
"Estimates range between 3,000 and 5,000, supported by airpower, naval assets, and military advisors," he told the Kyiv Independent.
Quilliam added that "the war in Ukraine has compelled Russia to reallocate significant military resources, including some from Syria."
"Reports suggest that several hundred personnel, particularly those involved in advanced weaponry operations, have been reassigned to support the conflict in Ukraine," he continued. "This redistribution has strained Russia's ability to sustain its military operations in Syria at previous levels."
Aron Lund, a Middle East analyst at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, also said that "Russia has a much lighter military footprint in Syria now than before invading Ukraine."
"The idea was always to keep a certain presence in the country and then be able to scale that up or down as needed," he told the Kyiv Independent. "It worked well until 2022, when Putin made the strategic blunder of invading Ukraine, overtaxing his armed forces to the point that he could no longer spare significant resources for anything else."
Bruchmann said that "Russia has withdrawn some but not all ground forces (from Syria) since 2022."
Iran and its proxies, which have been instrumental in propping up Assad's regime, have also been busy elsewhere in recent months.
Iran's Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, had been at war with Israel until they reached a ceasefire on Nov. 26, while the Gaza-based Hamas has been at war with Israel since October 2023.
Iran and Israel also struck each other directly several times earlier this year.
Olli Ruohomäki, a Middle East expert at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, told the Kyiv Independent that Israel took out Iranian military installations and "managed to degrade Hezbollah's capabilities."
Why did Aleppo fall?
The fall of Aleppo took several days, with the speed of the rebel offensive shocking observers. Analysts say that Russia's war against Ukraine and Iran's confrontation with Israel contributed to Assad's failure to hold on to the city.
"Had Russia had more resources to work with in Syria, it's possible that it would have slowed the rebel advances early on and helped shore up morale among Assad's forces," Lund said. "That said, the regime is in bad shape, and Iranian and Hezbollah backing had also withered a bit, so it's possible that the collapse would have come about even with much more solid Russian support."
Quilliam argued that "the 'status quo' that came to characterize Syria's situation since 2020 was never going to be sustainable, and events elsewhere in the region showed the opposition that the 'myth' about Hezbollah's dominance was a paper tiger."
"The same could be said for the Assad regime at a time when Moscow and Tehran were overstretched with their own struggles," he added.
Lucas said the fall of Aleppo was "a huge blow to the Russians and Assad."
He added that it also "helps Ukraine in a couple of ways."
"(Putin has) got this different theater that he's got to pay some attention to again," he said. "The problem here is that if he decides to go on the offensive in Syria, then it makes his hand much more difficult to play in Ukraine."
He also said that the situation in Syria "gives (Ukrainian President Volodymyr) Zelensky a much stronger hand to play at the table if Russia is in trouble elsewhere."
Can Russia preserve Assad's regime?
Experts who spoke with the Kyiv Independent say that it will be hard for Russia and Iran to lend a hand to Assad.
"In many cases, (Russian) military police and some lighter ground forces remain with several observation posts on the Syrian Golan," Bruchmann said. "These ground forces are not capable of securing the Syrian regime. That job will have to fall to Iran and its proxies."
He added that "the Russian Air Force is still able to act as support for the Syrian army and Iranian proxies, currently flying bombing sorties" and that "over the next days, Russian jets will likely try to slow down the Tahrir al-Sham advance until Syrian, Hezbollah and other Iranian proxy forces can organize a defense."
"Russia and Iran face significant economic and political constraints that limit their ability to provide full-scale support," Quilliam said. "Russia's war in Ukraine and the resulting sanctions have strained its economy, while Iran faces its own challenges, including the degrading of the Axis of Resistance and international sanctions."
Meanwhile, Lucas said that Russia had been "reticent to commit their support to Assad regaining these areas."
Michael Sahlin, a former Swedish ambassador to Turkey and a Middle East and Central Asia specialist at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said that Russia would likely have to limit itself to airstrikes in helping Assad's regime.
He also told the Kyiv Independent that Russia would also be cautious to get involved in Syria too much to avoid antagonizing U.S. President-elect Donald Trump before he takes office in January and initiates talks with the Kremlin. Russia's involvement could also spoil its relations with Turkey, which backs some of the rebels, according to Sahlin.
Lund was more cautious, saying that "Russia and Iran will do their best to shore up Assad's defenses and perhaps help him launch a counteroffensive."
"They may not be able to spare a lot, but even smaller contributions could be useful for Damascus," he added. "The Syrian war is not on the scale of Ukraine. If you throw some jets or a few thousand battle-tested troops into the mix, it can make a difference."
What if Assad falls?
Quilliam argued that "the erosion of Assad's control could also undermine Russian and Iranian influence in Syria and the broader Middle East, and that is a cost too high for Moscow and Tehran."
"Russia risks losing its military bases and influence in the Middle East, weakening its geopolitical position," he said. "Moscow's image as a power capable of countering the U.S. influence and stabilizing its allies would be severely damaged. This could embolden adversaries, such as the U.S., Turkey, and Gulf states, to assert greater influence in Syria, undermining Russian strategic ambitions."
Lund agreed that "should the regime fall, Russian interests in the Middle East and North Africa would take a bad hit."
"But ultimately, Syria isn't essential to Russia as such, and while the Middle East matters, it's not a core interest for Moscow," he said. "The war on Ukraine will be prioritized a million times higher."
However, it is too early to predict Assad's imminent downfall.
Ruohomäki said that the Aleppo offensive is unlikely to lead to the fall of Assad's regime because Russia would want to preserve it to keep its foothold in the Middle East.
"I don't think the Syrian government is about to fall," Lund said. "Losing Aleppo will be the hardest blow to Assad yet, and it will make a huge difference to the conflict and to how the country functions. Even so, Assad runs a really tenacious regime that has proven its intransigence many times."
He added that "we're likely to see a period of intense fighting, and then further down the line, there will be a new, wobbly equilibrium propped up by ceasefire deals negotiated between Russia, Turkey, and perhaps Iran."