It’s not 1,000 days of Russia’s war. It’s 3,925 — and Western risk aversion is setting up the next thousand

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine passes the 1,000-day mark, Western resolve appears to be wavering. US President-elect Donald Trump promises to end the war “within 24 hours” — echoing the same appeasement mindset that enabled Russian aggression after Crimea’s occupation. Calls to “freeze the conflict” grow louder, conveniently forgetting how the last such freeze in 2015 gave Russia time to prepare its full invasion.

This pattern of risk aversion — choosing short-term stability over confronting aggression — has a clear cost: each time the West steps back, Russia steps forward. Understanding this requires looking not at 1,000 days of war but at 3,925 days of Russian aggression that Western capitals repeatedly chose not to confront.

Lesson one: How Western inaction over Georgia emboldened Russia

The first critical display of Western risk aversion came after Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. While the West quickly returned to business as usual, Moscow launched what would become a $760 billion military modernization program. Considered Russia’s most significant military reform in 150 years, it focused on creating permanently combat-ready forces and modernizing weapons with Western technologies.

The reforms deliberately shifted from a defensive posture to offensive capabilities, retiring homeland defense units in favor of forces designed to project power into neighboring states.

According to security analyst Mykhailo Samus, Russia initially planned for a full-scale invasion by 2020, but corruption and the Euromaidan Revolution forced earlier, less prepared actions in 2014.

Lesson two: How appeasing Russia over Crimea enabled further aggression

Russia’s occupation of Crimea in February 2014 revealed a meticulously planned operation. Russian troops had been pre-positioned on the peninsula, outnumbering Ukrainian forces before the official start. The Kremlin orchestrated both military and political aspects of the takeover, with key figures like Glazyev and Zatulin managing the political transition while attempting to spark separatist movements across southeastern Ukraine.

The “Glazyev tapes” exposed how Russia had systematically bribed Crimean politicians, funded operations, and orchestrated the secession “referendum.” However, Russia’s occupation met only half-hearted Western sanctions which were poorly enforced. Dutch firms that helped build the Kerch bridge got off with minimal penalties, while Siemens supplied turbines to power plants in violation of sanctions, enabling the peninsula’s militarization.

The occupied peninsula became a crucial military asset for Russia’s broader strategy. By 2020, Russia had stationed up to 24 surface ships and submarines in Crimea, capable of carrying 168 Kalibr cruise missiles with a range exceeding 2,000 km. A classified 2019 Ukrainian defense report correctly predicted that Crimea would serve as a launchpad for massive strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure and enable a naval blockade of Ukrainian ports.

Lesson three: the Donbas civil war hoax that fooled the world

The war in Donbas was deliberately initiated by Russia, as admitted by FSB colonel Igor Girkin: “If our unit had not crossed the border, it would have all fizzled out, like it did in Kharkiv or Odesa,” where the Kremlin-orchestrated operation imploring for Russian intervention fell through.

Not so in the “Donbas and Luhansk People’s Republics.” There, Russia maintained plausible deniability through the use of private military companies, particularly Wagner, while Putin’s advisor Vladislav Surkov managed the political facade of “separatist republics.”

Ex-Russian GRU officer Igor Salikov’s testimony revealed how Russia carefully managed its military presence, ensuring only Soviet-era equipment was used to mask direct Russian involvement. When modern Russian equipment was destroyed near Debaltseve in 2015, Wagner commander Utkin ordered its immediate evacuation to maintain the fiction of local separatist forces.

This plausible deniability managed to fool much of the world: the hoax of a separatist pro-Russian uprising in Donbas pervaded international media. This trend is getting reassessed only now, with journalist Gulliver Craigg admitting that the “republics” in Donbas should have been framed as Russian aggression much more clearly from the beginning.

While the frozen conflict in Donbas was sizzling, the Kremlin heavily funded pro-Russian groups throughout Ukraine to undermine its sovereignty, as revealed in intercepted emails of Kremlin advisor Vladislav Surkov.

Lesson four: the deadly fiction of Minsk

The Minsk Agreements of 2014-2015 represent perhaps the most dangerous act of Western self-deception. While European leaders celebrated peace, leaked Kremlin emails show Moscow viewed these agreements exactly as intended: a tool to freeze the conflict that provided leverage over Ukraine’s foreign policy movements, particularly regarding NATO accession, while preparing for a larger war.

The agreements became a tool for Russia to push for Ukraine’s federalization while preparing for a full-scale invasion.

European leaders, particularly German Chancellor Angela Merkel, pressured Ukraine to comply with the agreements despite their inherent flaws. The deal effectively required Ukraine to bankroll Russia’s proxy “statelets” while ensuring their Kremlin-handpicked leaders could participate in Ukrainian political life.

Behind this diplomatic facade, Russia continued to supply advanced weaponry across the border in an operation codenamed “Voentorg” and prepared for further invasion.

According to a classified defense report seen by Euromaidan press, by 2019, Russia had positioned missile forces around Ukraine that could launch between 48 to 120 missiles in a first strike, reaching 350-400 km into Ukrainian territory.

Meanwhile, Russia kept militarizing occupied Donbas, preparing it as a launchpad for full invasion justl like occupied Crimea. OSINT investigations by Informnapalm identified more than 2,500 regular Russian soldiers from 98 military units operating in Ukraine.

By 2018, Russia’s proxy forces in eastern Ukraine numbered 32,000, with one-third consisting of Russian mercenaries and regular forces.

Lesson five: the “Russian world” doctrine — a clear statement of intent

Russia’s military transformation reflects a broader ideological shift toward reconstituting its imperial space. The concept of “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World) serves as the ideological foundation for intervention beyond Russia’s borders, claiming the right to “protect” Russian speakers and those deemed culturally Russian.

This doctrine found expression in new military documents that labeled the US and NATO as primary threats, returning to Cold War terminology of “aggressors” and “probable adversaries.” The rhetoric escalated with claims about “technologies of color revolutions and soft power” threatening Russia’s sphere of influence.

Surkov’s February 2022 essay questioned the legitimacy of Russia’s western borders, arguing for abolishing the “wicked peace” that kept Russia contained. The West chose to dismiss these explicit warnings of broader territorial ambitions, just as it had ignored earlier signals.

2024: we’re forgetting again

Now, as Ukraine marks 1,000 days of full-scale invasion, dangerous patterns re-emerge. Russia has slipped from being seen as the main threat to global security. Calls for Ukraine to accept a “compromise” grow louder. Meanwhile, Russian generals openly discuss expanding the war to Eastern Europe.

The choice facing the West isn’t between war and peace — it’s between stopping Russian aggression in Ukraine or facing it closer to home.

The first 2,925 days of this war teach a clear lesson: Moscow views every compromise as weakness, every negotiation as opportunity, and Western risk aversion as permission to escalate. Those pushing Ukraine toward compromise in 2024 aren’t ending the current war — they’re enabling the next one.

Related: