Voting wars tear Ukrainian America

The conservative leanings of the Ukrainian American community stem from immigration policies that shaped the state’s demographics, particularly among the latest wave of immigrants.

Many of these individuals found residence in the US due to policies that encouraged the emigration of Jews and Evangelical Christians fleeing Soviet oppression.

Ukrainian immigration to the US is generally divided into four waves: 1890-1914, 1922-1936, 1945-1953, and 1989 to the present. Among these groups, those from the third wave were “more urbanized, better educated, and more passionate about defending Ukrainian identity and independence,” says Ukrainian American academic Anastasia Kharitonova-Gomez.

Post-World War II Ukrainian migration was largely driven by oppressive Soviet policies and a crackdown on the independence movement, compounded by aggressive Russification efforts.

This experience sparked a strong dedication among Ukrainian immigrants to maintain their cultural identity in their new homeland, leading to the active establishment of Ukrainian churches and institutions across the US.

“Members of this wave often say they felt a responsibility to be torchbearers of Ukrainian identity abroad since it was being severely repressed back in the homeland,” she says.

However, migration from this generation faced significant hurdles due to the Soviet Union’s Cold War-era ban on leaving the country.

Oleh Wolowyna, director of the Center for Demographic and Socio-Economic Research of Ukrainians, pointed out that Soviet emigration policies stifled migration until the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of the Trade Act. Signed by President Ford in 1975, this legislation enabled the emigration of those persecuted for their religious beliefs.

In 1989, the US Congress enacted the Lautenberg Amendment, which further streamlined the resettlement of persecuted minorities from the Soviet Union. It significantly benefited Soviet Protestant Christians, including Baptists and Evangelicals, allowing those with “well-established histories of persecution” to seek refuge in the US.

In the decades that followed, around 500,000 Soviet Evangelicals, mostly from Ukraine, resettled in the US as refugees or through family reunification. Even today, many Ukrainians fleeing the war since 2022 have been Protestants, joining family and friends who had already made their homes in the United States.

“Most WWII refugees were Ukrainian Catholics from Western Ukraine,” Wolowyna said, highlighting their strong Ukrainian identity.

“Those coming after Ukraine’s independence were primarily economic migrants, many of whom had a less pronounced Ukrainian identity,” he says.

When prayers turn political

Kharitonova-Gomez points out that religious affiliation is a major force behind Ukrainian partisanship. In the US diaspora, it has flipped the balance of Christian denominations compared to Ukraine itself. This divide has sparked growing tension between generations of Ukrainian migrants.

“Most Ukrainians are Orthodox or Catholic, with only a small percentage identifying as Protestant,” she says. “In the diaspora, however, this is reversed, as many Ukrainians who immigrated in recent decades are Protestants.”

The stark contrast in backgrounds and motivations has fueled a growing divide within the Ukrainian American community, especially between the latest two waves. Third-wave immigrants from the 1940s-50s often fault the fourth wave, arriving since the late 1980s, for lacking patriotism and carrying too much Soviet influence.

Many fourth-wave migrants came seeking economic opportunity, making them less fervent about Ukrainian independence—a tension point that keeps the tension alive.

In sharp contrast, earlier waves of Ukrainian Americans—especially in the Midwest and East Coast—escaped Soviet oppression around World War II.

They largely lean Republican, inspired by the party’s staunch anti-Communist stance, championed by leaders like Ronald Reagan. This deeply ingrained anti-Soviet sentiment, now reignited by Russia’s aggression, remains a powerful force in their views today.

One of them is Orest Deychakiwsky, a former staffer for the US Helsinki Commission. As a member of a third-wave immigrant family, he has stepped up to launch the Ukrainian Americans for Harris-Walz Steering Committee. Orest is leading the charge to rally Ukrainian Americans in support of Kamala Harris for president.

Kharitonova-Gomez highlights that this religious divide shines a light on the broader political fractures within the Ukrainian American community. Evangelical Protestants usually lean Republican, while those without religious ties or non-evangelical Protestants tend to back Democrats.

Meanwhile, Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainians often stick to more conservative positions, adding further complexity to the community’s already complicated political landscape.

She notes that Ukrainian identity and concerns about Ukraine rarely top the list when it comes to how Ukrainian Americans vote. Instead, religious affiliation takes the spotlight, leading many eligible Ukrainian voters in Washington State to throw their support behind Trump.

“Ukrainian identity is not strong among most Protestants; religion is the predominant factor in their identity,” Wolovyna agrees.

Ukrainian faith, American vote